Karl That's cruel (July Digital Ship)! Any thoughts for an article in September? By the way, you're still not strictly correct re. the statement apropos INM-C (p12). While in practice it is difficult not to install INM-C to comply with SOLAS, there is no specific requirement to do so. All the regulations require is the carriage of an EGC receiver. And, indeed, it is possible to obtain an exemption from this if the ship operates in an area with adequate coverage using HF for MSI; the question of dealing with MSI in area A4, i.e., beyond INM-C coverage, is invariably 'pushed under the carpet' at IMO by the way. JRC did produce a stand-alone EGC receiver and, somewhere, I have a picture of it installed on a Japanese survey vessel in 1992. However it found no favour (remember my argument that equipment ideally needs to fulfil a commercial function if it is to be successful in safety applications) as, de facto, you got EGC thrown in for free with any INM-C terminal. Furthermore there is the issue of reserve power supplies. SOLAS requires the radio installations on ships - including INM or HF if in A3, and including if they are provided to fulfil duplication requirements - operate in a 'dead ship' condition for at least 6 hours if built before 1992, one hour if built after this date - you have to cross-reference to the emergency power supply requirements of SOLAS Chapter II-1. From memory, your typical INM-C requires about 150W of power for operation. Assuming 24 Volt power supply, using basic ohms law, this equates to 6.25 Amps. This means a battery of about 10 AH capacity should be more than adequate to provide the one hour operation required by SOLAS - you also need to be able to operate the VHF and an emergency light so the actual battery will need to be somewhat larger, but not much. You can normally get away with using a dry fit to fulfil this. INM-A/B requires orders of kw to operate primarily to drive the antenna array - and to keep the gyro active. This was an absolute killer in terms of being able to comply with SOLAS, i.e., continue operation in the 'dead ship' conditional; thus you can be assured most ships at sea today which claim to be using INM-A or B as part of its GMDSS radio installation is actually in breach of SOLAS - exception would be Norway who had a fixation about requiring batteries big enough to fill the Dome to keep the INC-A operational! INM Fleet is, of course, quite different to A/B in this respect. Without a mechanically stabilised antenna it has an energy requirement of the order of INM-C; bit larger, but not much. In other words, you can readily comply with the 'dead ship' operational condition of SOLAS with Fleet using small (cheap!!) batteries. Thus your original statement that ships fitted with INM Fleet do not need INM-C was factually correct. Not so much because of the EGC facility. More so, in practice, the ability to operate in the 'dead ship' condition with sensible (cheap!) battery arrangements is now a reality with the 'principal' INM terminal, i.e., the one the ship would prefer to use for the bulk of its commercial communications. Which means, of course, with INM Fleet there is now a business opportunity for someone. If they can brush off the blueprints for the 'stand alone' EGC, the overall GMDSS package of: a) Fleet plus 'stand alone' EGC should be significantly cheaper than, b) Fleet plus INM-C. Problem: if option a) takes off, and ships no longer install INM-C terminals (to comply with the 'dead ship' operation requirement, not the MSI per se) the viability of the 'C' network, and with it EGC itself may be called into question. I would see this to be a very small risk, however, as INM-C will continue to provide a low-cost, base satellite communications service for many ships for whom installation of Fleet will never be financially justifiable, i.e., they will stick to option b). EGC should be around for some time yet without needing an operational subsidy from member governments of IMO - ho, ho. (Why do you think AMVER fell from favour in Europe? Because Governments were no longer prepared to subsidise the communications from ships once PTTs refused to handle them for free having lost all commercial business from ships.) Saying this, I would see many advantages of using a stand-alone EGC receiver, not least removing most if not all of the potential 'human factor' errors of using a receiver integrated into an INM-C. In other words, reduce it to a true pure 'black box' that spits out safety information to the navigator in the format of preference; and remember this can be integrated with the ECDIS etc. Not that this is not done already. Just there is a certain reliance on the guys on the ship to ensure the equipment is logged on to the correct satellite for the MSI appropriate to the sea area of operation at all times. Indeed, I would go further and suggest all equipment on ships used to receive safety information should be reduced to a technology transparent 'black box' concept that can readily evolve as technology evolves. So, if any when EGC comes to a natural end, this should create no problems for those at sea. And were IMO a competent regulator when it comes to dealing with issues of ship-shore communications technology (answers on a postcard), it would appreciate what it needs to do when dealing with the receipt of safety information on ships is to establish an appropriate regulatory framework that facilitates true 'black box' operation - what the box must do specified in terms of operational reliability and integrity; errors per volume of data received etc. (as per the concepts applied in the original testing of Radio Officers' competence to receive safety information by Morse code by the way) - and not start meddling in the inconsequential issue of the actual communications protocols used by the black box; market led systems will always produce a better result in any event. Thus, if and when IMO realises AIS is actually a sick joke, with no standards mandated in terms of errors per volume of data received*, and that it can offer no technology progression, or at least none without throwing away rafts of hardware, it might then begin development of third generation MSI services - first generation was Morse, second NAVTEX/EGC - that can take full advantage of, inter alia, packet switching (GPRS e.g.) technologies to provide ships with timely, accurate and validated - someone is prepared to accept liability for its veracity - safety information. And EGC (or even AIS) could still be part of that providing you deal with 'black box' conceptual design - as could Fleet and future B-Gan operations. * Any geek with a £5 tx on the coast will be able to wipe-out AIS simply by transmitting jamming signals on the VHF channels it uses. And I spent three years chasing such geeks around London so do not believe it cannot happen (does anyone else involved with Digital Ship understand how issues relating to interference to marine radio, deliberate or otherwise, are enforced?)- Likely? No. The EC is now hell bent on squandering millions of Euros tilting at the AIS (and Galileo) windmill effectively putting a halt, as a consequence, to taking forward future development in ship-shore-ship data technologies; only STDMA may be used destroying any ideas of developing a 'black box' concept towards MSI. Excellent business if you are the (only) approved manufacturer of AIS (STDMA) . No benefit at all to the shipping industry particularly if, as I suspect, in reality no one is prepared to accept any liability for the veracity of the data transmitted over the AIS networks now being developed, networks that can provide absolutely no value added services. Long story. Have I just drafted another article on the fly? Regards Steve