MAIN HEAD Safety of bulk carriers DECK HEAD For the past 18 months or so I've been working in the 'real' shipping world, i.e., the formal safety assessment of bulk carriers, a project initated by the International Maritime Organisation (see www.fsa.mcga.gov.uk). This is the world represented by the m.v. Christopher. If you did not know, and few do, the Christopher was carrying coal to the United Kingdom when she sank just prior to XMAS with the loss of all crew; not a peep on the BBC. She sent no distress call (nothing worked) albeit the owners claim they were in communication just prior to her sinking. Which is rather confusing as, rumour has it; good rumour - the best kind of rumour, she'd been barred from most every Inmarsat service provider for non-payment of bills. In short, she was old, she was rotten, and operated by an organisation - who I will not name, but you can find - who, it would seem, never spent a penny (or at least not their own) on any communications technology, unless it could be avoided - and even it couldn't be avoided, e.g., GMDSS, would not bother to maintain it thereafter. So, what are we doing about it? SUBHEAD Monitoring hull stress One of the key issues coming to the fore in the analysis of bulk carrier safety is communications. More to the point, providing the necessary tools and information to stakeholders, particularly, but not exclusively, the seafarer, to effectively manage through-life hull stress; which encompasses a wide range of issues. Because, contrary to popular belief, the bulk carrier is a highly complex piece of kit which, if not handled with great care - perhaps even greater care than a gas carrier, and certainly more care than a tanker, can and will fail with catastrophic consequences, for the crew and the terminal operator if it happens alongside; Trade Daring/Lassia. With progress in all forms of information technology, it is now not overly difficult to provide the bulk carrier (any ship) with a truly effective (user friendly) hull stress management system. That is, a loading computer integrated with a range of onboard sensing and communications systems directly correlated with the ship's loading manual (stability book). In theory, it should be impossible to overstress the ship, at least not without raising appropriate alarms. These systems may also provide for early (earlier) warning of a hazardous situation developing - see Kamikawa Maru last September. SUBHEAD Sending data to shore And, taken further, applying SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) techniques, as used on the bulk carrier Elbe Ore, amongst others, hull stress and other relevant information - e.g., weather conditions - can readily, and continuously be relayed to the owners (assuming they care) for historical analysis. Put another way, you do not need a black box on any ship if the relevant information gathered is routinely stored on shore; but I doubt you can trust most owners so the black box will still have some role to play. The Classification Societies, in particular, are well advanced in the development of these technologies. For what it is worth, the colloquial term telegeomonitoring is applied to such techniques. Telegeomatics is a new discipline combining positioning systems, highbandwidth datacomms, GIS (geographic information system), cartography and the real-time exchange of information between sites and also real-time spatial decision making. It should not be forgotten a ship's hull is a large spatial area in its own right thus a 'GIS' style representation is appropriate; and is commonly used on most ships I ever had any dealings with albeit, perhaps, with not fully integrated information. It would be interesting to look at the potential impact of telegeomonitoring on ship operations, particularly safety, with emphasis on the benefits being brought through high bandwidth telecomms, e.g., the potential impact of third generation mobile at sea, such as with Inmarsat FLEET. Third generation mobile systems could have a big impact if it delivers the promise of global, competing networks - bust the INMARSAT monopoly, not that this will happen. INMARSAT is a natural monopoly - takes too long to go over the economic theories to explain why. SUBHEAD Safety integrity levels But to throw a quick curve ball or two, why is it I never seem to seem to see any discussion on issues, such as, 'safety integrity levels' (SIL standards) in relation to the programmable systems installed on ships? Or, why are the 'whole system' disciplines of aviation certification not applied on ships, i.e., who is ensuring the integrity of the 'whole system', including shorebased networks in the context of, perhaps, 'remote pilotage'? More to the point, who accepts the liability for any failure!? Those that know me realise this is a bit of scratched record. However, simply hiding behind the smokescreen of: 'ah well, the master is always ultimately responsible for ship safety, thus if my equipment goes faulty, or those certifying failed to spot the glitch, I have no worries: he carries the can!', is not going to hold water, if you excuse the pun. Try to find harmonised SIL standards for shipborne equipment in IMO or IEC standards - and I've tried, invariably go away empty handed. Subject in its own right, perhaps. SUBHEAD Coffin ships Back to bulk carriers. The ultimate paradigm for the safety regulators is how does the IMO ensure all these 'good ideas' relating to the application of digital communications on ships are equally provided on 'coffin ships' like the Christopher as well as the well-found, efficient ships like the Elbe Ore which already have them, as a rule? With the Elbe Ore's of this world increasingly been driven out of the market by 'coffin ships' able to offer lower rates, and having no difficulty finding customers prepared to hire on a 'ask no questions' basis'; particularly in the UK (ouch!!), will there be any future market for 'high cost' digital systems on future ships, certainly any thought to using these systems to benefit seafarers now increasingly viewed to be disposable chattels? Food for thought there, I trust. SUBHEAD Seafarers and technology Who should pay for seafarer social communications? It has to be the seafarer - but the owner should at least provide the means for these communications, in private. What is the benefit to shipowners of providing seafarers with communications facilities? Notwithstanding the above, probably not as much as perceived wisdom would suggest. Who should pay for computer based training courses? The Government. This is a tricky one, because if the UK sponsors training, for example, the well-known spongers of the world (the usual suspects) will take all the benefit but not provide any investment themselves. Still, training should be centrally funded in some form. How can voyage data recorder data be used for training and seafarer evaluation? It only works if used 'on site'. Shipboard behaviour is, almost exclusively, 'knowledge based'. That is, learnt through experience 'on the job'. The reasons for this are quite simple: there is very little activity onboard a ship which is appropriate for 'skill based' (unthinking and reactive) or 'rule based' (if this happens, I do this) behaviour. For example, a skill based behaviour might be ball juggling whereas flying a plane is largely rule based. Which means, to be truly effective, training should be undertaken within the context, i.e., in the environment of the specific ship - as a function of space and time. Clearly the VDR could play an important role in assisting the seafarer develop their 'knowledge based' expertise. Is seafarer communications really a $1.5 bn market? There are 50,000 ships. 50 seafarers per ship per year (probably nearer 40, but I'm keeping the maths simple) = 2,500,000 seafarer years per year. By my ready reckoning, each has to spend $600 in phone calls each year; $50 a month. Not impossible with INMARSAT's rates! How much involvement is it sensible to allow seafarers to have in vessel procurement? As much as possible, and he/she always did have, albeit not directly. My colleague was a 'traditional' superintendent with ABC (P&O) shipping. He therefore made a point of maintaining close contact with those at sea through regular visits etc. Largely independent from management, he could provide a workers' representative view into any procurement decisions. Alas, like the Radio Officer, he was sacked as have virtually all his peers; the R/Os are not alone in the great cull of expertise from shipping - they just seem to whinge more! And, like the R/O, nor are they going to be brought back. Should shipowners restrict seafarers from using the internet to find jobs with other employers? This is not an issue - the adverts are in the Telegraph anyway, and they can always see them when they get home! How important is it to shipowners to cultivate seafarer loyalty? If you want a well run, safety conscious ship, e.g., the Elbe Ore, very. If you don't care, and remain confident there are always those prepared to charter the ship who care even less, i.e., only concerned that the ship is cheap to hire (see above), not at all. What are the best ways technology can improve safety onboard? I have given you some ideas above. Contrary to what is often said about the GMDSS disrupting navigation (switch the kit off when you're in an A1/A2 area because the Coastguard are listening out for you), life at sea remains, largely, one of unremitting boredom, particularly as crew numbers decrease. Satellite TV is probably the best thing since sliced bread for most seafarers - better value for money for the owner than giving 'social' communications, unless you call it that. When is too much computers onboard a distracting hazard rather than a benefit? When it deludes the seafarer, i.e., believes what the computers - or, whatever else is providing the information, rather than his/her own eyes. And any computer generating information generates this risk. Which systems onboard genuinely reduce operational risk? The systems can give the seafarer more time to respond., particularly in situation awareness (navigation) and early warning of probable failures. They can truly reduce the propensity for human error. I reckon, sooner or later, ships' P+I clubs are going to have the balls off equipment suppliers if, as the good Admiral is saying at the MAIB (marine accident investigation branch, UK government agency), the installation of new technology is actually increasing risk, at least in the short term - radar effect all over again. Which means the equipment suppliers are going to have to spend more on their own liability insurance, and $200 million would not be an unreasonable level of risk to insure against.. SUBHEAD A FINAL COMMENT I think it is marvellous that the IMO will soon require each and every ship to continually broadcast, on an open radio channel, precise details of its identity, location and cargo carried unencrypted. Makes Osama Bin Laden's day if no one elses! I'm speaking about the AIS (automatic identification system), of course; why did the IMO not adopt an encrypted TDMA system for ship tracking such as that developed by RACAL and now in widespread use in many locations across the globe? Best ask IMO. No, I'll leave others to dig themselves out of that particular hole.