MAIN HEAD MAIB recommends watch alarms 1616 words - good full page piece DECK HEAD In the wake of the grounding of cargo vessel Jambo in Scotland, June 2003, when the chief officer fell asleep, the UK's Maritime Accident Investigation Board is recommending that ships fit watch alarms Images: MAIBtrack Caption: Chart showing the Jambo's intended and actual track (source MAIB) IMAGES: MAIB aground CAPTION: The vessel after running around (source MAIB) The UK Maritime Accident Investigation Board has published its report on the running aground of cargo vessel Jambo, on June 29, 2003 off the West Coast of Scotland, recommending that ships should fit alarms making sure the officers don't fall asleep. As a result of this, the UK's Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) will be taking recommendations to IMO for compulsory fitting of bridge watchkeeper alarms. However it notes, "that these devices are an attempt to address the symptoms, rather than the causes of, fatigue in watchkeepers. The bridge watchkeeper is required to reset a timer on the system at regular intervals, often around 10 minutes. If the timer is not reset then an alarm sounds in the master's cabin and in the deck officer's accommodation, indicating that the watchkeeper may have fallen asleep, had a heart attack, been taken over by pirates or has forgotten to reset the alarm. MAIB says that over six groundings a year occur in UK waters due to watchkeepers being incapacitated, for various reasons. "The only way to establish without doubt that it is safe for the officer on the watch (OOW) to be the sole lookout, is to ensure that should he become incapacitated in any way, this fact is brought to the attention of the remaining deck officers without delay," says MAIB. "It is not sufficient to have the lookout 'on the end of a radio', when MAIB experience shows that one of the prime dangers is that of the OOW being unable to call the lookout because he is incapacitated by fatigue or some other reason." "Therefore, if lookouts are not maintained on the bridge at all times, it is essential that such vessels are fitted with watch alarms." Jambo was not equipped with any such alarm, although of the 8 vessels operated by Reederei Hesse, only Jambo and a sister vessel did not have such an alarm. SUBHEAD Background The MV Jambo was Cypriot registered and German owned, carrying 3300 tonnes of zinc concentrate from Dublin, Ireland to Odda, Norway, and sank following the grounding. It carried 7 crew, but all crew were safely evacuated by coastguard lifeboat. The master was Croatian and he rest of the crew Polish. The chief officer fell asleep while alone on the bridge and missed his intended change of course. He was woken by the impact of the vessel grounding. The AB assigned to the watch was absent from the bridge for "at least an hour" before the vessel grounded, MAIB reports. The master and chief officer were running 6 to 12 and 12 to 6 watches, which MAIB describes as being "tiring in any event." The problem was compounded by regular port visits when the chief officer was required to work, regardless of how it fitted in with his sleep pattern. The vessel's normal route was between Sweden, the Baltic ports and the North Sea ports, UK and Ireland, with passages of 1-3 days and 1-2 days in port. SUBHEAD Fatigue In port, the master dealt with paperwork and officials; the chief officer was responsible for cargo operations. This work always disrupted the 6: 6 pattern. The chief officer's routine was to come off watch at 6pm, have a daily meal, going to his cabin at 2030 for a few hours sleep. He reported that he was unable to sleep on this day, although his cabin was quiet, his bunk comfortable and there was nothing specific on his mind. The company's safety management instructions about fatigue state, "The officer in charge of the first watch when leaving port should be adequately rested prior to going on watch to ensure that a safe and efficient watch is maintained. This is necessary from a health, as well as a safety consideration. The Master is expected to interpret this requirement in a reasonable manner and with the safety of the crew and ship firmly in mind. Masters must make suitable watch arrangements to ensure an adequate amount of rest while maintaining a reasonable momentum of work." SUBHEAD Story in detail According to MAIB, the chief officer was assigned to sleep 6am to 12 midday, work midday to 6pm, sleep 6pm to midnight and work midnight to 6am. However after his evening meal he had been unable to sleep 6pm to midnight. The mate had been working for around 12 hours a day for at least the 10 days prior to the incident While watchkeeping, the chief officer also worked on the bridge computer for a few minutes at a time, completing and printing voyage reports, conducting cargo stability calculations, and doing safety management system paperwork. According to MAIB, "he thought much of the paperwork associated with the safety management system pointless and a waste of time. He found the printer to be slow and the monitor's screen difficult to read in daylight." The master's normal practise was to require AB's to be additionally on the bridge from 10pm until 6am, also during periods of restricted visibility or when close to land. There were two AB night shifts, 10pm to 2am and 2am to 4pm. At 2.20am, the AB on watch, who was a heavy smoker, asked if he could leave the bridge and have a smoke in the mess room during his hourly "rounds" of the ship, which also included checking the accommodation an engine room. The AB returned at 3am. At 355am, the AB again asked the chief officer if he could go on his rounds. The chief officer agreed and asked the AB to bring him up a cup of Turkish coffee when he returned because he was starting to feel tired. While waiting for his coffee the chief officer walked around the bridge to keep himself awake. The AB completed his "rounds," had another cup of coffee and cigarette in the mess room, and then went to the ship's office to do some maintenance work as discussed with the chief officer at the beginning of the watch. The chief officer fell asleep between 0405 and 0415, being awoken at 0515, standing at the engine controls, by the grounding. The master was also woken and was on the bridge within 15 seconds. The chief officer was slowing and stopping the engine. The AB also returned to the bridge. The master asked the crew to check the hold for water; the chief officer reported that the fore peak tank, bow thruster compartment and double bottom port ballast tank were all flooded, with about 2 metres of water in the forward end of the hold. The master called the shipping company's "designated person" ashore and was unable to reach him, so he called the vessel's superintendent as designated backup. At 0600 he called Stornoway coastguard by VHF radio to report the situation. Te lifeboat arrived at 0721 and took off the crew. At 0955 the master reported that the vessel has sunk with her bow out of the water. SUBHEAD QinetiQ research Although the rest patterns are allowable by IMO rules, MAIB contracted the QinetiQ centre for human sciences o study the chief officer's routines and hours of work and comment on his likely level of fatigue. QinetiQ notes that the shift pattern of working midnight to 6am, midday to 6pm,is the most difficult, because the person has to work at the period where he is most naturally tired (midnight to 6am). Alertness and performance for anybody tend to be at their lowest 4am to 6am, it states. The problems become more severe during the later stages of a long period of continuous work. It also notes that 1800 to 2400 is "not a natural time for sleep." "The mate's inability to sleep during this period is not surprising," it says. QinetiQ notes that in general, it is better to minimise the number of consecutive night duties to minimise sleep deficit associated with successive daytime sleeps. The mate had been working for around 12 hours a day for at least the 10 days prior to the incident. However most of the port work had been during the daytime. There was opportunity for a full night's sleep while the vessel was berthed in Glasgow, four nights before the incident. The continual alternation between night work at sea and short periods in port with day work is "not an ideal work pattern," QinetiQ says. "There is little time for the body to adapt to the new routine. It is important that some recovery from the night work can be provided in port so that the crew member can be reasonably well rested before setting sail." "Balancing the potential consequences of fatigue, against the commercial consequences of a delayed departure, demands fine judgment," QinetiQ says. "It is likely that masters will, probably more often than not, be more influenced by commercial than by safety considerations simply because the commercial impact is immediately apparent and the risks, by their nature, are only probable." "The master's judgment would also be influenced by whether or not he considered that regulations had been complied with. It is not, therefore, surprising that the master made no provision to compensate for the disrupted rest experienced by the chief officer in Dublin and allowed him to return to the six-on six-off schedule that night." BOX TEXT MAIB's full report can be downloaded free of charge from http://www.maib.dft.gov.uk/