Electronic chart requirement on high speed craft - MAIB recommends http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_maritimesafety/documents/page/dft_masafety_030083.pdf PLENTY OF PHOTOS - I will get them later The UK Maritime Accident and Investigation Board (MAIB) has made a recommendation to the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) that it brings up the issue of compulsory electronic chart systems on high speed craft at the appropriate IMO committees and sub-committees, in particular the IMO Design and Equipment Sub-Committee intercessional correspondence group, presently considering another revision of the HSC code. In full, MAIB is recommending "the introduction of a requirement for all high speed craft to be fitted with navigation instruments designed to cope with the unique requirements of high speed craft, in particular a display such as ECDIS or ENC, which gives an instantaneous indication of charted position, to be fitted on all vessels except those solely engaged on line of sight voyages. The recommendation follows MAIB's investigation into a grounding of a brand new high-speed vessel "Katia" at 38 knots at night in winter, during trials of the UK's Isle of Wight. During the grounding, the vessel had a master and chief officer who were surveyors / consultants, retired from the sea, with no current experience navigating high-speed craft. The chief officer, sitting in the pilot's seat, was navigating the vessel using buoys and lights. At 38 knots he had 1 minute and 22 seconds in which to turn the vessel before grounding it on a spit; he waited a few seconds to make sure the vessel passed the buoy before turning, and then turned too late. According to MAIB's report, at that time the master was writing in the logbook using a flashlight that the vessel had just passed the buoy, and the chief officer was talking to a charterer's representative as well as driving the vessel. It was the end of a long day. There was one injury, by a person flung against the ship's railings by the grounding - there was minor damage to the hull and propellers. "Planning of the passage, general navigation and manoeuvres would have been greatly assisted had an electronic chart system been fitted to the vessel," says MAIB. "There is insufficient time to use traditional chart work techniques for navigation on craft travelling at high speeds." MAIB also notes that there was no passage planning, with the vessel expected to be navigated by eye. The master had established ground rules for people on the bridge at a departure briefing, but did not enforce them. The accident happened on Dec 3, 2003, at 1735pm, during sea trials. The vessel was built by Vosper Thorneycroft and planned to be used in the Mediterranean. There were 25 people onboard for the trial, including shipyard personnel, technicians and surveyors. The vessel was 27m long with 150 passenger seats. It was built to DNV 1A1 HSLC passenger 2 Passenger EO notation, under the jurisdiction of the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). SUBHEAD Problems on the bridge During the investigation MAIB found many faults in the bridge design, and told the shipbuilder to conduct a thorough risk assessment before continuing with the trials. In particular there was light pollution from the passenger cabin onto the bridge; there was no gyro heading indication or rate of turn indication in the eye line of the navigator; there was no navigation equipment available at the co-pilot's position. Neither the speed log nor the echo sounder were reliable at speeds of over 20 knots. The bridge side windows became obscured with condensation because no demisters had been fitted and need frequent wiping with a cloth A white bridge deckhead and light grey navigation console also adversely affected night vision due to reflected light, and the fixed range rings of the radar were set in km and attempts to change this to nautical miles before and during the trial had failed. The vessel had no electronic chart system and no voyage data recorder. The tiller did not have an "amidships" notch fitted and was not spring loaded, adding to the concentration needed to steer a steady course. Also the fuel gauges gave erroneous readings. During the building stages, the MCA, approving the design, was asked to liaise with the shipbuilders, whilst the ship operator retained the authority to make design changes. MAIB notes that the operating compartment was non-compliant with the HSC code in that the window frame stiffeners caused some obstruction to the view; the arc of vision was not wide enough; no rate of turn indicator was fitted; the instruments required were not plainly visible and easily read without deviation from normal seating position / line of vision - the was glare in the operating area environment, and high contrast between the work area and surroundings. SUBHEAD Recommendations MAIB comments that it believes there is a need for a requirement to fit electronic chart systems on all high speed craft; there should be a standard layout of instruments on high speed craft; there should be two officers operating all high speed craft except on short line of sight voyages - and officers should have suitable instrumentation to fulfil their roles. "MCA should take forward the above findings in the IMO Design and Equipment Sub-Committee intercessional correspondence group, presently considering another revision of the HSC code," MAIB says. MAIB has issued a chief inspector's letter to the shipbuilders, advising them to undertake no further sea trials, without looking at visibility from the control position, lack of instrumentation available at the co-pilot's position, the positioning of gyro repeater, rate of turn indicator and engine speed indicator, the lack of navigation systems, the ergonomics of the bridge, requirements for a dedicated lookout, control of visitors to the bridge, bridge resource management.